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Network FunctionsVirtualization (NFV) is a network architecture concept where network functionality is virtualized and separated
into multiple building blocks that may connect or be chained together to implement the required services. The main advantages
consist of an increase in network flexibility and scalability. Indeed, each part of the service chain can be allocated and reallocated at
runtime depending on demand. In this paper, we present and evaluate an energy-aware Game-Theory-based solution for resource
allocation of Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) within NFV environments. We consider each VNF as a player of the problem
that competes for the physical network node capacity pool, seeking the minimization of individual cost functions. The physical
network nodes dynamically adjust their processing capacity according to the incoming workload, by means of an Adaptive Rate
(AR) strategy that aims at minimizing the product of energy consumption and processing delay. On the basis of the result of the
nodes’ AR strategy, the VNFs’ resource sharing costs assume a polynomial form in the workflows, which admits a unique Nash
Equilibrium (NE). We examine the effect of different (unconstrained and constrained) forms of the nodes’ optimization problem
on the equilibrium and compare the power consumption and delay achieved with energy-aware and non-energy-aware strategy
profiles.
1. Introduction
In the last few years, power consumption has shown a grow-
ing and alarming trend in all industrial sectors, particularly in
Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Public
organizations, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and telecom
operators started reporting alarming statistics of network
energy requirements and of the related carbon footprint since
the first decade of the 2000s [1]. The Global e-Sustainability
Initiative (GeSI) estimated a growth of ICT greenhouse gas
emissions (in GtCO
2
e, Gt of CO
2
equivalent gases) to 2.3%
of global emissions (from 1.3% in 2002) in 2020, if no Green
Network Technologies (GNTs) would be adopted [2]. On the
other hand, the abatement potential of ICT in other industrial
sectors is seven times the size of the ICT sector’s own carbon
footprint.
Only recently, due to the rise in energy price, the contin-
uous growth of customer population, the increase in broad-
band access demand, and the expanding number of services
being offered by telecoms and providers, has energy efficiency
become a high-priority objective also for wired networks and
service infrastructures (after having started to be addressed
for datacenters and wireless networks).
The increasing network energy consumption essentially
depends onnew services offered,which followMoore’s law, by
doubling every two years, and on the need to sustain an ever-
growing population of users and user devices. In order to sup-
port new generation network infrastructures and related ser-
vices, telecoms and ISPs need a larger equipment base, with
sophisticated architecture able to perform more and more
complex operations in a scalable way. Notwithstanding these
efforts, it is well known that most networks and networking
equipment are currently still provisioned for busy or rush
hour load, which typically exceeds their average utilization by
a wide margin. While this margin is generally reached in rare
and short time periods, the overall power consumption in
today’s networks remains more or less constant with respect
to different traffic utilization levels.
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The growing trend toward implementing networking
functionalities by means of software [3] on general-purpose
machines and of making more aggressive use of virtualiza-
tion—as represented by the paradigms of Software Defined
Networking (SDN) [4] andNetwork FunctionsVirtualization
(NFV) [5]—would also not be sufficient in itself to reduce
power consumption, unless accompanied by “green” opti-
mization and consolidation strategies acting as energy-aware
traffic engineering policies at the network level [6]. At the
same time, processing devices inside the network need to be
capable of adapting their performance to the changing traffic
conditions, by trading off power andQuality of Service (QoS)
requirements. Among the various techniques that can be
adopted to this purpose to implement Control Policies (CPs)
in network processing devices, Dynamic Adaptation ones
consist of adapting the processing rate (AR) or of exploiting
low power consumption states in idle periods (LPI) [7].
In this paper, we introduce a Game-Theory-based solu-
tion for energy-aware allocation of Virtualized Network
Functions (VNFs) within NFV environments. In more detail,
in NFV networks, a collection of service chains must be allo-
cated on physical network nodes. A service chain is a set of
one or more VNFs grouped together to provide specific ser-
vice functionality and can be represented by an oriented
graph, where each node corresponds to a particular VNF and
each edge describes the operational flow exchanged between
a pair of VNFs.
A service request can be allocated on dedicated hardware
or by using resources deployed by the Service Provider
(SP) that processes the request through virtualized instances.
Because of this, two types of service deployments are possible
in an NFV network: (i) on physical nodes and (ii) on virtual-
ized instances.
In this paper, we focus on the second type of service
deployment. We refer to this paradigm as pure NFV. As
already outlined above, the SP processes the service request
by means of VNFs. In particular, we developed an energy-
aware solution to the problem ofVNFs’ allocation on physical
network nodes.This solution is based on the concept of Game
Theory (GT). GT is used to model interactions among self-
interested players and predict their choice of strategies to
optimize cost or utility functions, until a Nash Equilibrium
(NE) is reached, where no player can further increase its
corresponding utility through individual action (see, e.g., [8]
for specific applications in networking).
More specifically, we consider a bank of physical network
nodes (in this paper, we also use the terms node and resource
to refer to the physical network node) performing tasks on
requests submitted by players’ population. Hence, in this
game, the role of the players is represented by VNFs that
compete for the processing capacity pool, each by seeking the
minimization of an individual cost function. The nodes can
dynamically adjust their processing capacity according to
the incoming workload (the processing power required by
incoming VNF requests) by means of an AR strategy that
aims at minimizing the product of energy consumption and
processing delay. On the basis of the result of the nodes’ AR
strategy, the VNFs’ resource sharing costs assume a poly-
nomial form in the workloads, which admits a unique NE.
We examine the effect of different (unconstrained and con-
strained) forms of the nodes’ optimization problem on the
equilibrium and compare the power consumption and delay
achieved with energy-aware and non-energy-aware strategy
profiles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the related work. Section 3 briefly summarizes the
powermodel andARoptimization thatwas introduced in [9].
Although the scenario in [9] is different, it is reasonable to
assume that similar considerations are valid here, too. On the
basis of this result, we derive a number of competitive strate-
gies for the VFNs’ allocation in Section 4. Section 5 presents
various numerical evaluations, and Section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2. Related Work
We now discuss the most relevant works that deal with the
resource allocation of VNFs within NFV environments. We
decided not only to describe solutions based on GT, but also
to provide an overview of the current state of the art in this
area. As introduced in the previous section, the key enabling
paradigms that will considerably affect the dynamics of ICT
networks are SDN and NFV, which are discussed in recent
surveys [10–12]. Indeed, SPs and Network Operators (NOs)
are facing increasing problems to design and implement
novel network functionalities, following rapid changes that
characterize the current ISPs and telecom operators (TOs)
[13].
Virtualization represents an efficient and cost-effective
strategy to exploit and share physical network resources.
In this context, the Network Embedding Problem (NEP)
has been considered in several recent works [14–19]. In
particular, the Virtual Network Embedding Problem (VNEP)
consists of finding the mapping between a set of requests
for virtual network resources and the available underlying
physical infrastructure (the so-called substrate), ensuring that
some given performance requirements (on nodes and links)
are guaranteed. Typical node requirements are computational
resources (i.e., CPU) or storage space, whereas links have a
limited bandwidth and introduce a delay. It has been shown
that this problem is NP-hard (it includes as subproblem
the multiway separator problem). For this reason, heuristic
approaches have been devised [20].
The consolidation of virtual resources is considered in
[18], by taking into account energy efficiency. The problem is
formulated as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
model, to understand the potential benefits that can be
achieved by packing many different virtual tasks on the same
physical infrastructure. The observed energy saving is up to
30% for nodes and up to 25% for link energy consumption.
Reference [21] presents a solution for the resilient deployment
of network functions, using OpenStack for the design and
implementation of the proposed service orchestrator mech-
anism.
An allocation mechanism, based on auction theory, is
proposed in [22]. In particular, the scheme selects the most
remunerative virtual network requests, while satisfying QoS
requirements and physical network constraints.The system is
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split into two network substrates modeling physical and vir-
tual resources, with the final goal of finding the best mapping
of virtual nodes and links onto physical ones according to the
QoS requirements (i.e., bandwidth, delay, and CPU bounds).
A novel network architecture is proposed in [23], to pro-
vide efficient coordinated control of both internal network
function state and network forwarding state, in order to
help operators achieve the following goals: (i) offering and
satisfying tight service level agreements (SLAs); (ii) accu-
rately monitoring and manipulating network traffic; and (iii)
minimizing operating expenses.
Various engineering problems, where the action of one
component has some impacts on the other components, have
been modeled by GT. Indeed, GT, which has been applied at
the beginning in economics and related domains, is gaining
much interest today as a powerful tool to analyze and design
communication networks [24]. Therefore, the problems can
be formulated in the GT framework, and a stable solution for
the components is obtained using the concept of equilibrium
[25]. In this regard, GT has been used extensively to develop
understanding of stable operating points for autonomous
networks. The nodes are considered as the players. Payoff
functions are often defined according to achieved connection
bandwidth or similar technical metrics.
To construct algorithms with provable convergence to
equilibrium points, many approaches consider network
models that can be mapped to specially constructed games.
Among this type of games, potential games use a real-valued
function that represents the entire player set to optimize some
performance metric [8, 26]. We mention Altman et al. [27],
who provide an extensive survey on networking games. The
models and papers discussed in this reference mostly deal
with noncooperativeGT, the only exception being a short sec-
tion focused on bargaining games. Finally, Seddiki et al. [25]
presented an approach based on two-stage noncooperative
games for bandwidth allocation, which aims at reducing the
complexity of networkmanagement and avoiding bandwidth
performance problems in a virtualized network environment.
The first stage of the game is the bandwidth negotiation,
where the SP requests bandwidth from multiple Infrastruc-
ture Providers (InPs). Each InP decides whether to accept or
deny the request when the SP would cause link congestion.
The second stage is the bandwidth provisioning game, where
different SPs compete for the bandwidth capacity of a physical
link managed by a single InP.
3. Modeling Power Management Techniques
Dynamic Adaptation techniques in physical network nodes
reduce the energy usage, by exploiting the fact that systems
do not need to run at peak performance all the time.
Rate adaptation is obtained by tuning the clock frequency
and/or voltage of processors (DVFS, Dynamic Voltage and
Frequency Scaling) or by throttling the CPU clock (i.e., the
clock signal is disabled for some number of cycles at regular
intervals). Decreasing the operating frequency and the volt-
age of the node, or throttling its clock, obviously allows the
reduction of power consumption and of heat dissipation, at
the price of slower performance.
Advantage can be taken of these adaptation capabilities to
devise control techniques based on feedback on the incoming
load. One of the first proposals is that examined in a seminal
paper by Nedevschi et al. [28]. Among other possibilities, we
consider here the simple optimization strategy developed in
[9] aimed at minimizing the product of power consumption
and processing delay with respect to the processing load.The
application of this control technique gives rise to quadratic
dependence of the power-delay product on the load, which
will be exploited in our subsequent game theoretic resource
allocation problem. Unlike the cited works, our solution con-
siders as load the requests rate of services that the SP must
process. However, apart from this difference, the general con-
siderations described are valid here, too.
Specifically, the dynamic frequency-dependent part of
the processor power consumption is proportional to the
clock frequency ] and to the square of the supply voltage
𝑉 [29]. However, if DVFS is used, there is proportionality
between the frequency and the voltage raised to some power
𝛾, 0 < 𝛾 ≤ 1 [30]. Moreover, the power scaling effect
induced by alternating active-idle periods in the queueing
system served by the physical network node can be accounted
for by multiplying the dynamic power consumption by an
increasing concave function of the resource utilization of the
form (𝑓/𝜇)1/𝛼, where 𝛼 ≥ 1 is a parameter and 𝑓 and 𝜇 are
the workload (processing requests per unit time) and the task
processing speed, respectively. By taking 𝛾 = 1 (which implies
a cubic relationship in the operating frequency), the overall
dependence of the power consumption Φ on the processing
speed (which is proportional to the operating frequency) can
be expressed as [9]








where 𝐾 > 0 is a proportionality constant. This expression
will be exploited in the optimization problems to be defined
and studied in the next section.
4. System Model of Coordinated
Network Management Optimization and
Players’ Game
We consider the situation shown in Figure 1. There are 𝑆
VNFs that are represented by the incoming workload rates
𝜆
1
, . . . , 𝜆
𝑆
, competing for 𝑁 physical network nodes. The













is VNF 𝑖’s contribution. The total workload vector
of player 𝑖 is f 𝑖 = col[𝑓𝑖
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Figure 1: System model for VNFs resource allocation.
The computational resources have processing rates 𝜇
𝑗
,






















Cost functions of the form shown in (4) have been intro-
duced in [9] and represent the product of power and process-
ing delay, under 𝑀/𝑀/1 assumption on each node’s queue.
They actually correspond to the average energy consumption
that can be attributed to functions’ handling (considering that
the node will be active whenever there are queued functions).
Despite the possible inaccuracy in the representation of the
queueing behavior, the denominator of (4) reflects the penalty
paid for approaching the resource capacity, which is a major
aspect in a model to be used for control purposes.
We now consider two specific control problems, whose
resulting resource allocations are interconnected. Specifically,
we assume the presence ofControl Policies (CPs) acting in the
network node, whose aim is to dynamically adjust the pro-
cessing rate, in order to minimize cost functions of the form
of (4). On the other hand, the players representing the VNFs,
knowing the policy adopted by the CPs and the resulting
form of their optimal costs, implement their own strategies
to distribute their requests among the different resources.
The simple control structure that we envisage actually
represents a situation that may be of interest in a number of
different operational settings. We only mention two different
cases of current high relevance: (i) a multitenant environ-
ment, where a number of ISPs are offered services by a
datacenter operator (or by a telecom operator in the access
network) on a number of virtual machines, and (ii) a collec-
tion of virtual environments created by a SP on behalf of its
customers, where services are activated to represent cus-
tomers’ functionalities on their own private virtual LANs. It
is worth noting that in both cases the nodes’ customers may
be unwilling to disclose their loads to one another, which
justifies the decentralized game optimization.
4.1. Nodes’ Control Policies. We consider two possible vari-
ants.
4.1.1. CP1 (Unconstrained). The direct minimization of (4)
















































We must note that we are considering a continuous solu-
tion to the node capacity adjustment. In practice, the physical
resources allow a discrete set of working frequencies, with
corresponding processing capacities. This would also ensure
that the processing speed does not decrease below a lower
threshold, avoiding excessive delay in the case of low load.
The unconstrained problem is an idealized variant that would
make sense only when the load on the node is not too small.
4.1.2. CP2 (Individual Constraints). Each node has a maxi-
mum and a minimum processing capacity, which are taken














































































































































4.2. Noncooperative Players’ Optimization. Given the optimal
CPs, which can be found in functional form, we can then state
the following.
4.2.1. Players’ Problem. Each VNF 𝑖 wants to minimize, with
respect to its workload vector f 𝑖 = col[𝑓𝑖
1
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(over its workload distribution) sum of the resources’ costs,











































) 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑆.
(8)
In this formulation, the players’ problem is a noncooper-
ative game, of which we can seek a NE [31].
We examine the case of the application of CP1 first. Then,















































is the total flow from the other VNFs to
node 𝑗.
The cost in (9) is convex in 𝑓𝑖
𝑗
and belongs to a category
of cost functions previously investigated in the networking
literature, without specific reference to energy efficiency [32,
33]. In particular, it is in the family of functions considered in
[33], for which the NE Point (NEP) existence and uniqueness
conditions of Rosen [34] have been shown to hold.Therefore,
our players’ problem admits a unique NEP. The latter can be
found by considering the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker stationarity



























𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑁,
(10)

























































Excluding the negative solution, the nonzero components are
those with the smallest and equal partial derivatives that, in a

































As regards form (7) of the optimal node cost, we can note






, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
(a coupled convex constraint set), the conditions of Rosen still






𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, the nodes’ optimal cost functions are no
longer of polynomial type. However, the composite function
is still continuously differentiable (see the Appendix).Then, it
would (i) satisfy the conditions for a convex game (the overall
function composed of the three parts is convex), which
guarantee the existence of a NEP [34, Th. 1], and (ii) possess
equivalent properties to functions of Type A as defined in
[32], which lead to uniqueness of the NEP.
5. Numerical Results
In order to evaluate our criterion, we present numerical
results deriving from the application of the simplest Control
Policy (CP1), which implies the solution of a completely quad-
ratic problem (corresponding to costs as in (9) for the NEP).
We compare the resulting allocations, power consumption,
and average delays with those stemming from the application
(on non-energy-aware nodes) of the algorithm for the mini-
mization of the pure delay function that was developed in [35,
Proposition 1]. This algorithm is considered a valid reference
point in order to provide good validation of our criterion.The












































The total demand is assumed to be less than the total
operating capacity, as we have done with our CP2 in (7).
To make the comparison fair, we have to make sure that
the maximum operating capacities 𝜇max
𝑗
, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 (that
are constant in (14)), are compatiblewith the quadratic behav-




denote the total inputworkload tonode 𝑗 correspond-









, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁. (15)







, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑆,
the total node input workloads and those corresponding to
VNF 𝑖, respectively, produced by the NEP deriving from the
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minimization of costs in (13). The average delays for the flow































































































































Our data for the comparison are organized as follows.We
consider normalized input rates, so that 𝜆
𝑖
≤ 1, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑆.
We generate randomly 𝑆 values corresponding to the VNFs’
input rates from independent uniform distributions; then,





, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, also from
independent uniform distributions (with 1 ≤ 𝐾
𝑗
≤
10, 2 ≤ 𝛼
𝑗
≤ 3, resp.);
(2) by using the workload profiles obtained, we compute
the values 𝜇max
𝑗
, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, from (15) and find the
NEP corresponding to costs in (13) and (14), by using
the same input rates;
(3) we compute the corresponding average delays and
power consumption values for the two cases, by using
(16) and (17), respectively.
Steps (1)–(3) are repeated with a new configuration of
random values of the input rates for a certain number of
times; then, for both games, we average the values of the
delays and power consumption per VNF, and of the total
delay and power consumption averaged over the VNFs, over
all trials.We compare the results obtained in this way for four
different settings of VNFs and nodes; namely, 𝑆 = 𝑁 = 3; 𝑆 =
3, 𝑁 = 5; 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 3; 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 5. The rationale of
repeating the experiments with random configurations is to
explore a number of different possible settings and collect the
results in a synthetic form.
For each VNFs-nodes setting, 30 random input config-
urations are generated to produce the final average values.
In Figures 2–10, the labels EE and NEE refer to the energy-
efficient case (quadratic cost) and to the non-energy-efficient










































Figure 2: Power consumption with 𝑆 = 𝑁 = 3.




































Figure 3: User (VNF) delays with 𝑆 = 𝑁 = 3.
one (see (13) and (14)), respectively. Instead, the label “Saving
(%)” refers to the saving (in percentage) of the EE case com-
pared to the NEE one. When it is negative, the EE case pre-
sents higher values than theNEE one. Finally, the label “User”
refers to the VNF.
The results are reported in Figures 2–10. The model
implementation and the relative results have been developed
with MATLAB® [36].
In general, the energy-efficient optimization tends to save
energy at the expense of a relatively small increase in delay.
Indeed, as shown in the figures, the saving is positive for the
energy consumption and negative for delay. The energy sav-
ing is always higher than 18% in every case, while the delay
increase is always lower than 4%.
However, it can be noted (by comparing, e.g., Figures 5
and 7) that configurationswith lower load are penalized in the
delay.This effect is caused by the behavior of the simple linear
adaptation strategy, whichmaintains constant utilization, and








































Figure 4: Power consumption with 𝑆 = 3, 𝑁 = 5.


































Figure 5: User (VNF) delays with 𝑆 = 3, 𝑁 = 5.







































Figure 6: Power consumption with 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 3.
































Figure 7: User (VNF) delays with 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 3.







































Figure 8: Power consumption with 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 5.




































Figure 9: User (VNF) delays with 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 5.














































Figure 10: Power consumption and delay product of the various
cases.
highlights the relevance of setting not only maximum, but
also minimum values for the processing capacity (or for the
node input workloads).
Another consideration arising from the results concerns
the variation of the energy consumption, by changing the
number of players and/or the nodes. For example, Figure 6
(case 𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 3) shows total power consumption
significantly higher than the one shown in Figure 8 (case
𝑆 = 5, 𝑁 = 5). The reasons for this difference are due to
the lower workload managed by the nodes of the case 𝑆 =
5, 𝑁 = 5 (greater number of nodes with an equal number of
users) making it possible to exploit the AR mechanisms with
significant energy saving.
Finally, Figure 10 shows the product of the power con-
sumption and the delay for each studied case. As described in
the previous sections, our criterion aims at minimizing this
product. As can be easily seen, the saving resulting from the
application of our policy is always above 10%.
6. Conclusions
We have examined the possible effect of introducing simple
energy optimization strategies in physical network nodes
performing services for a set of VNFs that request their com-
putational power within an NFV environment. The VNFs’
strategy profiles for resource sharing have been obtained from
the solution of a noncooperative game, where the players
are aware of the adaptive behavior of the resources, and
aim at minimizing costs that reflect this behavior. We have
compared the energy consumption and processing delay with
those stemming from a game played with non-energy-aware
nodes and VNFs. The results show that the effect on delay
is almost negligible, whereas significant power saving can be
obtained. In particular, the energy saving is always higher
than 18% in every case, with a delay increase always lower
than 4%.
From another point of view, it would also be of interest
to investigate socially optimal solutions stemming from a
Nash Bargaining Problem (NBP), along the lines of [37], by
defining suitable utility functions for the players. Another
interesting evolution of this work could be the application of
additional constraints to the proposed solution such as, for
example, the maximum delay that a flow can support.
Appendix








. By noting that the derivative of the
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